Prior research has underscored the prevalence of deceptive negotiation behavior in buyer-supplier negotiations, focusing primarily on the potentially negative consequences. Based on a literature review and 22 interviews with purchasing and sales managers, we explore the types of deception that purchasing and sales managers find acceptable, as well as their consequences. Based on the interview evidence, we corroborate past findings that various types of deception differ in their degree of acceptability. Moreover, we reconcile findings from past research that were inconclusive on the acceptability of some deception types. In addition to the harmful consequences of deception in the supply chain, the interview evidence also shows that deception that the target perceives as acceptable may elicit positive consequences, including higher negotiation process satisfaction. Overall, the findings add to emergent literature on bluffing as a distinct form of deception by showing that bluffing and lying differ not only in their psychological consequences but also in their economic, relational, and reputational consequences.
