This research investigates when and why packaging multiple issues into smaller subsets helps achieve integrative agreements. We predict that subset issue packaging will help parties reach more mutually beneficial outcomes than negotiating all issues simultaneously, but only when parties do not close the package (i.e., conclude the package with an agreement) before negotiating the next one. Two experiments (N = 416) tested these predictions. When parties packaged issues into smaller subsets and negotiated these packages sequentially throughout the negotiation, they achieved higher economic outcomes compared to those who negotiated the entire set of issues simultaneously or those who negotiated the issues as packages only at the beginning or middle phases of the negotiation (Experiment 1). However, when parties were required to reach an agreement on one issue package before proceeding to the next, this issue-packaging advantage disappeared (Experiment 2). Mediation analyses revealed that parties’ integrative judgment accuracy and their logrolling behavior sequentially accounted for the issue-packaging effect. The findings of this research are discussed in relation to their contribution to agenda-setting and negotiation literature.
