The argument that corporate governance should compel management to internalize stakeholder welfare, thereby mitigating opportunistic behavior by firms, is a cornerstone of classic property rights theory. However, critics have long questioned the feasibility of governance arrangements that enfranchise stakeholders at scale. This study provides a longitudinal analysis of the 8-year consent process for the A66 highway expansion in the UK, shedding light on the challenges of managing large-scale stakeholder enfranchisement. UK laws mandate consultation with all stakeholders affected by nationally significant infrastructure projects, with dispute resolution overseen by an independent monitor. While these laws aim to balance individual freedoms and collective welfare, economic models struggle to quantify the intangible benefits of stakeholder collaboration. This misalignment creates a "wicked problem": managers incur escalating costs to foster stakeholder cooperation in joint value creation activities, yet these expenditures erode perceived shareholder value, exacerbating agency tensions. Inadequate project budgets further leave managers caught in protracted cycles of inefficient bargaining and vulnerable to holdup by opportunistic stakeholders. This study contributes to our understanding of the social arrangements needed to balance the gains from exercising rights to create harms against the losses from those harms, offering critical insights into the complexities of stakeholder governance in practice.
