This research focuses on the phenomenon of CEO activism, where CEOs take socio-political stances as response to criticism. While the body of research on CEO activism is expanding within management studies, its role as a response strategy remains underexplored. In this study, we investigate how CEOs' sociopolitical stands, taken as a reaction to criticism, contribute to the existing literature on CEO activism. Drawing from upper echelons theory, we hypothesize that investors generally respond negatively to CEOs' activist actions when they perceive them as responses to criticism. We also observe that investors' reactions vary depending on the attributes of the activism, such as whether the stance is communicated through social media or traditional channels like interviews or conferences. Furthermore, we suggest that this negative reaction is lessened when CEOs convey their activism messages in unexpected, unconventional ways. Our research, based on a sample of U.S. public firms, offers empirical evidence that defensive activism by CEOs can be a strategic response to criticism.
