This paper interrogates the role of open organizing in addressing crises in a historically opaque industry, raising crucial questions about how industries constrained by market dynamics and entrenched secrecy can navigate public accountability. Through an in-depth analysis of interviews and industry documentation, the study examines how insurers adopted interorganizational collaborations and pro-bono initiatives to mitigate reputational damage while simultaneously contending with epistemic and political barriers that obstructed substantive progress on pandemic insurance solutions. The findings reveal a nuanced strategic calculus: insurers deftly employed signaling, narrative control, and the reframing of responsibility onto government stakeholders as mechanisms to deflect scrutiny and preserve their legitimacy. By positioning governmental intervention as indispensable to resolving the crisis, insurers effectively curtailed reputational fallout while leaving the structural challenge of pandemic insurability unresolved. This research contributes to policy and management scholarship by highlighting the dual-edged nature of open organizing as both a tool for reputational repair and a vehicle for responsibility deflection. Policymakers can draw on these insights to design frameworks that reconcile corporate accountability with the complexity of systemic crises.
