14840: Closely Monitored by the Supervisor Yet Cheat Even More? An Evaluative Apprehension Approach (session 25553)

Evidence indicates that the practice of cheating is widespread in today’s workplaces, prompting supervisors to adopt close monitoring practices in an effort to deter employees from engaging in such behaviors. Our research examines the paradoxical effects of supervisors’ close monitoring on employees’ engagement in cheating behaviors. Drawing on evaluative apprehension theory, we argue that supervisors’ close monitoring, irrespective of their intent, heightens employees’ evaluative apprehension, which subsequently drives them to engage in cheating behaviors as a means of maintaining a favorable image in their supervisors’ eyes. Integrating moral identity theory into this framework, we propose that employees’ moral identity centrality serves as a crucial boundary condition for the relationship between supervisors’ close monitoring and employees’ cheating via their evaluative apprehension. Specifically, when moral identity is central to employees’ self-concept, it functions as moral self-censorship, aligning their actions with ethical principles and thereby mitigating the likelihood that employees engage in cheating behaviors as a result of their evaluative apprehension. Using a time-lagged design field study, we obtained empirical support for these contentions. Our findings offer actionable insights for organizations, highlighting the need to minimize supervisory close monitoring practices and cultivate moral identity among employees as strategies to reduce cheating.

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