This study examines the role of strategic timing in disruptive innovation. We construct a biform game model where an entrant decides when to enter with a potentially disruptive technology, and the incumbent determines whether and when to switch from its existing technology. By accounting for endogenous firm-specific learning alongside exogenous technological improvement, our model highlights the critical role of timing in shaping disruption. First, an entrant's strategic timing—whether to enter early or delay entry—can cause disruption by deferring the timing of the incumbent's response or deterring it altogether. Second, we identify conditions where incumbents, even those unable to initially mount a response, can later switch to the disruptive technology and coexist with an entrant. Based on these insights, we propose a typology of five distinct disruption types—Perfect, Postponed, Passing, Phased, and Partial—that expands the traditional understanding of disruption beyond the oft-studied “perfect” cases to comprehend transient and mixed cases as well. Our theory of disruptive timing integrates literatures on strategic timing and disruptive innovation to offer a new perspective for scholars and actionable insights for practitioners.
