13890: Dependence Reimagined: Extending & Enriching Conceptualizations of Dependence in Boards Literature

The role of director independence is a cornerstone of organizational governance research, integrating insights from strategy, organizational theory, and financial economics. Often viewed as a mechanism to enhance board oversight, traditional conceptualizations of independence rely on a binary distinction between insider and outsider roles. However, dependence, defined as the reliance on resource provision or rewards within board relationships, reveals a nuanced dimension of governance dynamics to be further explored. Emerging studies challenge the prevailing dichotomy, suggesting that director dependence encompasses financial, social, and professional dimensions, influencing board members' monitoring and decision-making capabilities. This symposium advances governance research by reevaluating the agency theory perspective on director dependence and proposing broader conceptualizations to address its complexity. Specifically, it aims to: (1) refine theoretical frameworks surrounding director dependence, (2) examine its measurable impacts on governance outcomes, and (3) explore alternative perspectives to assess dependence in diverse organizational contexts. By expanding the scope of dependence nuances beyond the employment of the firm, the discussion will illuminate how varying forms of dependence shape board behaviors, firm strategies, and shareholder value. This symposium seeks to contribute to a broader understanding of board governance mechanisms.